

Boulder Total Return Fund, Inc.  
Boulder Growth & Income Fund, Inc.  
The Denali Fund Inc.

**Proxy Voting Procedures**

The Board of Directors of the Boulder Total Return Fund, Inc., Boulder Growth & Income Fund, Inc. and The Denali Fund Inc. (collectively, the "**Funds**") hereby adopt the following policies and procedures with respect to voting proxies relating to portfolio securities held by the Funds (collectively, the "**Voting Policies**").

1. **Policy.** It is the policy of each of the Boards of Directors of the Funds (the "**Board**") to delegate the responsibility for voting proxies relating to portfolio securities held by the Funds to Boulder Investment Advisers, L.L.C. (the "**Adviser**") as a part of the Adviser's general management of the Funds, subject to the Board's continuing oversight.<sup>1</sup> The voting of proxies is an integral part of the investment management services that the Adviser provides pursuant to the advisory contract. Proxy voting policies and procedures are required by Rule 206 (4)-6 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and became effective August 6, 2003.

2. **Fiduciary Duty.** The right to vote a proxy with respect to portfolio securities held by the Funds is a significant asset of the Fund. The Adviser, to which authority to vote on behalf of the Funds is delegated, exercises this voting responsibility as a fiduciary, and votes proxies in a manner consistent with the best interest of the Funds and its shareholders, and with the goal of maximizing the value of the Funds and the shareholders' investments.

3. **Procedures.** The following are the procedures adopted by the Board for the administration of this policy:

a. **Review of Adviser Proxy Voting Procedures.** The Adviser, with advice and counsel from the Board, shall present to the Board its policies, procedures and other guideline for voting proxies at least annually (the "**Voting Guidelines**"), and must notify the Board promptly of any material changes. In accordance with the foregoing, the Adviser has developed the Voting Guidelines which are attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

b. **Voting Record Reporting.** No less than annually, the Adviser shall report to the Board a record of each proxy voted with respect to portfolio securities of the Funds during the respective year. With respect to those proxies the Adviser has identified as involving a conflict of interest<sup>2</sup>, the Adviser shall submit a separate report indicating the nature of the conflict of interest and how that conflict was resolved with respect to the voting of the proxy.

4. **Revocation.** The delegation by the Board of the authority to vote proxies relating to portfolio securities of the Funds is entirely voluntary and may be revoked by the Board, in whole or in part, at any time. This disclosure shall be included in any registration statement filed on behalf of the Funds after July 1, 2003.

5. **Annual Filing.** The Fund shall file an annual report of each proxy voted with respect to portfolio securities of the Funds during the twelve-month period ended June 30 on Form N-PX not later than August 31 of each year. The Fund must file the complete proxy voting record on an annual basis on

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<sup>1</sup> This policy is adopted for the purpose of the disclosure requirements adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Releases No. 33-8188, 34-47304, IC-25922.

<sup>2</sup> As it is used in this document, the term "conflict of interest" refers to a situation in which the Adviser or affiliated persons of the adviser have a financial interest in a matter presented by a proxy other than the obligation it incurs as investment adviser to the Funds which compromises the Adviser's independence of judgment and action with respect to the voting of the proxy.

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this form. Form N-PX must contain complete proxy voting records for the 12 month period stated above, and must be signed on behalf of the Fund by the principal executive officers. This form must provide the following information:

1. Name of the issuer of the portfolio security
2. Exchange ticker symbol
3. CUSIP #
4. Shareholder meeting date
5. Brief indication of the matter voted on
6. Whether matter was proposed by the issuer or by a security holder
7. Whether the Fund cast its vote on the matter
8. How the Fund cast its vote
9. Whether the Fund cast its vote for or against management

### 6. **Disclosures.**

a. The Fund shall include in any future registration statement:

- i. A description of the Voting Policies and the Voting Guidelines<sup>3</sup>; and
- ii. A statement disclosing that information regarding how the Fund voted proxies relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-month period ended June 30 is available without charge, upon request, by calling the Funds' toll-free telephone number; or through a specified Internet address; or both; and on the SEC website.<sup>4</sup>

b. The Fund shall include in its Annual and Semi-Annual Reports to shareholders:

- i. A statement disclosing that the Voting Policies and Voting Guidelines are available without charge, upon request, by calling the Funds' toll-free telephone number; or through a specified Internet address; and on the SEC website.<sup>5</sup>
- ii. A statement disclosing that information regarding how the Fund voted proxies relating to portfolio securities during the most recent 12-month period ended June 30 is available without charge, upon request, by calling the Fund's toll-free telephone number; or through a specified Internet address; or both; and on the SEC website.<sup>6</sup>

### 7. **Recordkeeping Requirements.** SEC Rule 204-2, as amended, requires advisers to retain:

1. Proxy voting policies and procedures
2. Proxy statements received regarding client securities
3. Records of votes cast on behalf of clients
4. Records of written client requests
5. Any documents prepared by the adviser material to making a decision how to vote, or that memorialized the basis for the decision.

8. **Review of Policy.** At least annually, the Board shall review this Policy to determine its sufficiency and shall make and approve any changes that it deems necessary from time to time.

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<sup>3</sup> This disclosure is included in all registration statements filed on behalf of the Funds after July 1, 2003.

<sup>4</sup> This disclosure is included in all registration statements filed on behalf of the Funds after August 31, 2004.

<sup>5</sup> This disclosure is included in all reports filed on behalf of the Funds after July 1, 2003.

<sup>6</sup> This disclosure is included in all reports filed on behalf of the Funds after August 31, 2004.

**EXHIBIT A – VOTING GUIDELINES**

The Funds' and Advisors' proxy voting principles are summarized below, with specific examples of voting decisions for the types of proposals that are most frequently presented:

<b>Category</b>	<b>Guideline</b>	<b>Voting</b>
<b>BOARD OF DIRECTOR ISSUES</b>	The board of directors' primary role is to protect the interests of all shareholders. Key functions of the board are to approve the direction of corporate strategy, ensure succession of management and evaluate performance of the corporation as well as senior management. The board is accountable to shareholders, and must operate independently from management.	
Routine Elections	Generally we will vote with management's recommendation	Generally FOR
Board Classification	Generally we are opposed to entrenchment mechanisms and will vote against proposals to classify a board. We prefer annual election of directors in order that shareholders have more power to replace directors deemed to not be acting in the shareholders' interest.	Generally AGAINST
Independence of Directors	The majority of board members should be independent from the corporation, management or a majority shareholder. An independent member should not be a former employee of the company or a representative of a key supplier to or a key client of the company.	We will generally support boards that have a majority of board members classified as independent.
Director Indemnification	Mandatory indemnification of directors and officers is necessary to attract quality candidates.	Generally FOR
Director Attendance	Board membership requires a significant amount of time in order for responsibilities to be executed, and attendance at Board and Committee meetings is noted.	We look for attendance records to be in the 75% participation range.
Term Limits	We are more concerned with the performance of directors and not with the term limits	Generally AGAINST but will look at on a case-by-case basis.
Separation of Chair and CEO	In most cases it is advisable for there to be a separation between the CEO and the Chair to enhance separation of management interests and shareholders.	In most cases we would support a recommendation to separate the Chair from the CEO. Lead directors are considered acceptable, and in this situation an independent Corporate Governance committee must also be in place.
Committees of the Board	Audit, Compensation, Governance and Nominating committees are the most significant committees of the board.	We support the establishment of these committees, however independent director membership on these committees is the primary concern. Two-thirds independent membership is satisfactory, provided that the chair of each committee is independent.
Audit Process	The members of an audit committee should be independent directors, and the auditor must also be independent. The auditor should report directly to the Audit	We will generally support the choice of auditors recommended by the Audit

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	committee and not to management.	Committee. In the event that the auditor supplies other services for a fee other than the audit, each situation will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
<b>VOTING AND ENTRENCHMENT ISSUES</b>		
Shareholder Right to Call Special Meeting		Generally FOR
Shareholder Right to Act by Written Consent		Generally FOR
Cumulative Voting	Our experience has been that cumulative voting is generally proposed by large shareholders who may wish to exert undue influence on the board.	Generally AGAINST, although we may consider if the board has been unresponsive to shareholders.
Confidentiality of Shareholder Voting	Like any other electoral system, the voting at annual and special meetings should be confidential and free from any potential coercion and/or impropriety.	We will support any proposals to introduce or maintain confidential voting.
Size of Board of Directors	Generally boards should be comprised of a minimum of seven to a maximum of fifteen. However the complexity of the company has an impact on required board size.	The independence of the board is a greater concern than the number of members. However should a change in board size be proposed as potentially an anti-takeover measure we would vote against.
<b>COMPENSATION ISSUES</b>		
Director Compensation	Directors should be compensated fairly for the time and expertise they devote on behalf of shareholders. We favor directors personally owning shares in the corporation, and that they receive a substantial portion of their remuneration in the form of shares.	We support recommendations where a portion of the remuneration is to be in the form of common stock. We do not support options for directors, and do not support retirement bonuses or benefits for directors.
<b>MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION</b>		
	Compensation plans for executives should be designed to attract and retain the right people with exceptional skills to manage the company successfully long-term. These plans should be competitive within the company's respective industry without being excessive and should attempt to align the executive's interests with the long-term interest of shareholders.	Executive compensation will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Stock Options and Incentive Compensation Plans	Compensation plans should be designed to reward good performance of executives. They should also encourage management to own stock so as to align their financial interests with those of the shareholders. It is important that these plans are disclosed to the shareholders in detail for their approval.	We will not support plans with options priced below current market value or the lowering of the exercise price on any previously granted options. We will not support any plan amendment that is not

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		capped or that results in anything but negligible dilution. We believe that shareholders should have a say in all aspects of option plans and therefore will not support omnibus stock option plans or plans where the Board is given discretion to set the terms. Plans will be considered on a case-by-case basis.
Adopt/Amend Employee Stock Purchase Plans		Considered on a case-by-case basis.
Golden Parachutes	Although we believe that "golden parachutes" may be a good way to attract, retain and encourage objectivity of qualified executives by providing financial security in the case of a change in the structure or control of a company, golden parachutes can be excessive.	Generally opposed but will consider on a case-by-case basis.
Require Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachutes		Generally FOR
<b>TAKEOVER PROTECTIONS</b>	Some companies adopt shareholder rights plans that incorporate anti-takeover measures, which may include: poison pills, crown jewel defense, payment of greenmail, going private transactions, leveraged buyouts, lock-up arrangements, Fair price amendments, Re-incorporation. Rights plans should be designed to ensure that all shareholders are treated equally in the event there is a change in control of a company. These plans should also provide the Board with sufficient time to ensure that the appropriate course of action is chosen to ensure shareholder interests have been protected. However, many shareholder rights plans can be used to prevent bids that might in fact be in the shareholders best interests. Depending on their contents, these plans may also adversely influence current share prices and long-term shareholder value.	We will review each situation on a case-by-case basis. We will generally support proposals that protect the rights and share value of shareholders.
Dual Class Shares	It is not unusual for certain classes of shares to have more than one vote per share. This is referred to as a dual class share structure and can result in a minority of shareholders having the ability to make decisions that may not be in the best interests of the majority of shareholders.	Generally AGAINST.
Super-Majority Voting Provisions	Super-majority voting (e.g., 67% of votes cast or a majority of outstanding shares), although fairly common, can, from a practical point of view, be difficult to obtain, and essentially are a bar from effective challenges to entrenched management, regardless of performance or popularity. A very high requirement can be unwieldy and therefore not in the best interest of the majority of shareholders.	Generally AGAINST. We will generally oppose proposals for voting requirements that are greater than a majority of votes cast. That said, we will review supermajority proposals on a case-by-case basis.

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Issuance of Authorized Shares		Generally FOR
Issuance of Unlimited or Additional Shares	Corporations may increase their authorized number of shares in order to implement a stock split, to support an acquisition or restructuring plan, to use in a stock option plan or to implement an anti-takeover plan. Shareholders should approve of the specific business need for the increase in the number of shares and should understand that the issuance of new shares can have a significant effect on the value of existing shares.	Generally AGAINST. We will generally oppose proposals to increase the number of authorized shares to "unlimited", but will consider any proposals to increase the number of authorized shares on a case-by-case basis for a valid business purpose.
Shareholder Proposals	Shareholders should have the opportunity to raise their concerns or issues to company management, the board and other shareholders. As long as these proposals deal with appropriate issues and are not for the purposes of airing personal grievances or to obtain publicity, they should be included on the proxy ballot for consideration.	Shareholder proposals will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
<b>OTHER MATTERS</b>		
Stock Repurchase Plans		Generally FOR
Stock Splits		Generally FOR
Require Shareholder Approval to issue Preferred Stock		Generally FOR
Corporate Loans to Employees	Corporate loans, or the guaranteeing of loans, to enable employees to purchase company stock or options should be avoided. These types of loans can be risky if the company stock declines or the employee is terminated.	Generally AGAINST.
Blank-cheque Preferred Shares	The authorization of blank-cheque preferred shares gives the board of directors' complete discretion to fix voting, dividend, conversion and other rights and privileges. Once these shares have been authorized, the shareholders have no authority to determine how or when they will be allocated. There may be valid business reasons for the issuance of these shares but the potential for abuse outweighs the benefits.	Generally AGAINST.

Dated: October 26, 2007